ce adverse to religion in his case was not merely the result of
rival metaphysical dogmas opposed to religion, such as were seen in the
Pantheists of Padua, or in Spinoza; nor even the opposition caused by the
adoption of a different standard of truth for pronouncing on revelation,
as in his fellow English deists; but it sprung from the application of the
subjective psychological inquiry into the limits of religious knowledge,
as a means for criticising not only the logical strength of the evidence
of religion, but specially the historic evidence of testimony. We
consequently see the influence exercised by the subjective branch of
metaphysical inquiries in the discussion not only of the logic of
religion, but also of the logic of the historic aspect of it.

Hume's religious speculations(480) relate to three points:--to the argument
for the attributes of God, drawn from final causes; to the doctrine of
Providence, and future rewards and punishments; and to the evidence of
testimony as the proof of miracles. Though he does not conduct an open
assault in reference to any of them, but only suggests doubts, yet in each
case his insinuations sap so completely the very proof, that it is clear
that they are intended as grounds not merely for doubt, but for disbelief.
His doctrine of sensation is the clue to his remarks on the two former. He
argues that we can draw no sound inferences on the questions, because the
subjects lie beyond the range of sensational experience. It is however in
consequence of his remarks on the last of the three subjects in his essay
on Miracles that his name has become famous in the history of free
thought.

The essay consists of two parts. In the first he shows that miracles are
incapable of proof by testimony. Belief is in proportion to evidence.
Evidence rests on sensational experience. Accordingly the testimony to the
uniformity of nature being universal, and that which exists in favour of
the occurrence of a miracle, or violation of the laws of nature, being
partial, the former must outweigh the latter. In the second he shows, that
if this is true, provided the testimony be of the highest kind, much more
will it be so in actual cases; inasmuch as no miracle is recorded, the
evidence for which reaches to this high standard. He explains the elements
of weakness in the evidence; such as the predisposition of mankind to
believe prodigies, forged miracles, the decrease of miracles with the
progress of