of the doctrine of Hume will not only illustrate our main
position, of the influence of intellectual and philosophical causes in
generating doubt, or at least in directing free thought into a sceptical
tendency, but will illustrate the application made of that special
department of metaphysics which relates to the test of truth, to discredit
the literary proof of revelation as an historic system.

We have now sketched the natural history of deism, by showing that in this
as in former periods the forms which free thought assumed were determined
by the philosophy, and, in a slighter degree, by the critical knowledge of
the age.

The inquiry into method in the seventeenth century had led men to break
with authority, and rebuild from its foundations the temple of truth.
Locke, imbibing this spirit, had gauged anew the human understanding, and
had sought a new origin for its knowledge, and given expression to the
appeal to the reasoning powers, which marked the age. Political
circumstances had not only generated free inquiry, but had required each
man to form his political creed. In all departments reason was appealed
to. Even the province of the imagination was invaded by it, and perfection
of form preferred to freshness of conception in art and poetry. The doubt
of the age reflected the same spirit. Whether its advocates belonged to
the school of Descartes or of Locke, both alike examined religion by the
standard of psychology and ethics. That which was to be believed was to be
comprehended as well as apprehended. Yet the appeal was not made to reason
in its highest form; and, with a show of depth, philosophy nevertheless
failed to exhibit the deepest analysis.

We have watched the exhibition of the successive phases of the attack, and
have seen reason, first examining the method of theology, protesting
against mystery in doctrine or morals; next criticising the historic
reality of the evidence offered for its doctrines; then denying the moral
utility of revelation, or attacking the doctrines and internal truths;
lastly denying the validity of testimony for the supernatural.

In the later steps the influence of the French school of speculation is
already observable, mingling itself with English deism. Consequently the
subsequent traces of unbelief in England must be deferred till the nature
of this movement has been explained.

Deism stands contrasted with the unbelief of other times by certain
peculiarities. In its c