ate, carried by 197 to 143 a motion
that Luttrell "ought to have been returned". This decision, which set at
nought the rights of electors, was the inevitable outcome of the vote of
expulsion. The king was victorious, and was delighted at his victory.
His satisfaction was soon alloyed, for the means which he had employed
to gain his end roused widespread indignation. He had brought himself
into conflict with his people and had blunted his weapons. He had
gradually got together a set of ministers through whom he could rule;
for some of them were his willing instruments, and the rest, though
uneasy at their position, forbore to oppose him. At great cost to
himself and the nation he had secured a majority in the house of
commons, and he had strengthened his cause by enlisting on his side the
jealousy with which the house regarded all matters of privilege. Neither
his ministers nor the house failed him, not even when called upon to
violate the constitution, but his policy rendered both alike odious to
the nation. Wilkes was a gainer by his own defeat. Thousands who had
little or no sympathy with him personally espoused his cause when they
found it justly associated with liberty. A large subscription was made
for him: L17,000 was spent in paying his debts; his long-deferred suit
against Halifax was at last heard, and he obtained L4,000 damages; he
was again enabled to live in comfort, and while still in prison was
elected an alderman of London.

Other causes contributed to the unpopularity of the ministers, among
them the French annexation of Corsica. The island rebelled against the
Genoese; and they, finding themselves unable to subdue it, agreed to
sell it to France. The bravery of the insurgents excited sympathy in
England; and there was a strong feeling that the acquisition of the
island by France would increase her naval strength, which was reasonably
regarded with jealousy. "Corsica," said Burke, "as a province of France
is terrible to me;" and Sir Charles Saunders, who had commanded in the
Mediterranean, held that to prevent the proposed annexation would be
well worth a war. There was, however, something to be said on the other
side. The ministers might have pursued either one of two courses. They
might have given France to understand that they would make the
annexation of the island a cause of war, and in that case France would
probably have drawn back; or they might, without loss of dignity, have
passed the matter b