an excuse we have it.--The landing of
the troops could not be prevented at the distance of 6 or 7 miles from
our lines; on a plain under the cannon of the ships, just in with the
shore. Our unequal numbers would not admit attacking them on the plain
when landed.

When our principal barrier was lost, our numbers so much inferior to
the enemy, they not disposed to storm our lines, but set down to make
regular approaches to us--were part of the reasons which induced a
retreat from thence and a consequent abandoning New York--. Our
sentinels & guards in my opinion were well posted, they might have
been better, too great security I thought prevailed with some leading
officers, but I still am of opinion, if our guards on the West road &
Col. Miles on East End of the hills had done their duty, the enemy
would not have passed those important heights, without such very great
loss as would have obliged them to abandon any further enterprise on
the Island....

I am sir
Your Most Humble Sv't
SAM'L H. PARSONS.

[Originals in possession of Hon. Charles Francis Adams.]

[No. 6.]

BRIG. GEN. SCOTT TO JOHN JAY

WHITE PLAINS, N.Y.

NEW YORK Sept. 6, 1776.

DEAR SIR:

I received your letter about half an hour ago by the messengers of the
honorable convention, in which you inform me that they are anxious to
be informed of any transactions at this place that may be of use to
the State, or otherwise of importance. My duty would have directed me
to execute this task before the receipt of your letter, had I been
possessed of the means of conveyance. I shall do it now as far as the
want of good pen and ink, as scarce as almost every other necessary
article, will permit.

I shall begin with our retreat from Long Island. For previous to that
event the convention was so near the scene of action that they must
have been acquainted with every occurrence. I was summoned to a
Council of War at Mr. Philip Livingston's house on Thursday 29th
ult. never having had reason to expect a proposition for a retreat
till it was mentioned. Upon my arrival at the lines on the Tuesday
morning before, and just after the enemy, by beating General Sullivan
and Lord Stirling, had gained the heights _which in their nature
appear to have been more defensible than the lines were_, it was
obvious to me we could not maintain them for any long time should the
enemy approach us regularly. _They were unfinished in several places
when I arrived th