see this order communicated to their respective corps
and to see it carried into execution....

Brigadier Lord Stirling to command the front of our lines next
Hudson's River and to command the reserve within the lines, and when
either of the other Brigade Generals have the command of the Advance
Lines Lord Stirling is to have command of his post in his absence.
Each Brigadier General to assign the Alarm Posts to the several
Regiments under their command.

[No. 3.]

GENERAL ORDERS

HEAD-QUARTERS LONG ISLAND Aug. 29, 1776.

Parole, SULLIVAN, }
Countersign, GREEN. }

As the sick are an encumbrance to the Army, & Troops are expected this
afternoon from the flying camp in Jersey, under Genl Mercer, who is
himself arrived & room & cover is wanted for the troops, the
commanding Officers of Regt's are immediately to have such sick
removed. They are to take their Arms & Accoutrements & be conducted by
an Officer to the Genl Hospital, as a rendezvous & then to cross
to-gether under the directions of the Person appointed there, taking
general Directions from Dr Morgan. As the above Forces under Genl
Mercer are expected this afternoon, the General proposes to relieve a
proportionate Number of Regiments & make a change in the situation of
them.

The Commanding Officers of Regiments are therefore to parade their men
with their Arms, Accoutrements, and Knapsacks, at 7 oClock, at the
Head of their Encampments & there wait for Orders.[232]

[From MS. Order Book of Col. Wm. Douglas.]

[Footnote 232: The series of Washington's general orders in Force's
Archives does not contain this order of August 29th, which throws
light on the preparations made for the retreat. It is found, abridged,
in both Col. Little's and Capt. Douglass's order books; in Col.
Douglas's book it appears in the above form. Original in the
possession of Benjamin Douglas, Esq., Middletown, Conn.]

HEAD-QUARTERS, NEW YORK, August 31, 1776.

(Parole, HARLEM.) (Countersign, FLUSHING.)

... Both officers and soldiers are informed that the retreat from
_Long-Island_ was made by the unanimous advice of all the General
Officers, not from any doubts of the spirit of the troops, but because
they found the troops very much fatigued with hard duty, and divided
into many detachments, while the enemy had their main body on the
Island, and capable of receiving assistance from the shipping. In
these circumstances it was thought unsafe to transport the whole o