atter, said Prodicus.

Then you would consider him a simpleton who supposed that he could
obtain by praying to the Gods the knowledge of grammar or music or
any other art, which he must either learn from another or find out for
himself?

Prodicus agreed to this also.

And when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and receive good, you
mean by your prayer nothing else than that you desire to become good and
wise:--if, at least, things are good to the good and wise and evil to
the evil. But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, it
would appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not know.

Hereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to him if he
had been proved to be in error in supposing that the Gods immediately
granted to us whatever we asked:--if, I added, whenever you go up to
the Acropolis you earnestly entreat the Gods to grant you good things,
although you know not whether they can yield your request, it is as
though you went to the doors of the grammarian and begged him, although
you had never made a study of the art, to give you a knowledge of
grammar which would enable you forthwith to do the business of a
grammarian.

While I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate upon his
youthful assailant, intending to employ the argument of which you have
just made use; for he was annoyed to have it supposed that he offered a
vain prayer to the Gods. But the master of the gymnasium came to him and
begged him to leave because he was teaching the youths doctrines which
were unsuited to them, and therefore bad for them.

I have told you this because I want you to understand how men are
circumstanced in regard to philosophy. Had Prodicus been present and
said what you have said, the audience would have thought him raving, and
he would have been ejected from the gymnasium. But you have argued so
excellently well that you have not only persuaded your hearers, but have
brought your opponent to an agreement. For just as in the law courts,
if two witnesses testify to the same fact, one of whom seems to be an
honest fellow and the other a rogue, the testimony of the rogue often
has the contrary effect on the judges' minds to what he intended, while
the same evidence if given by the honest man at once strikes them as
perfectly true. And probably the audience have something of the same
feeling about yourself and Prodicus; they think him a Sophist and a
braggart, and regard you as