which we call 'man.' Now if any one were to ask us, What
is that of which, if we were rid, we should not want medicine and the
instruments of medicine, we might reply that this would be the case if
disease were absent from our bodies and either never came to them at all
or went away again as soon as it appeared; and we may therefore conclude
that medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of disease.
But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free,
we should have no need of wealth? can we give an answer? If we have
none, suppose that we restate the question thus:--If a man could live
without food or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, would
he want either money or anything else in order to supply his needs?
ERYXIAS: He would not.
SOCRATES: And does not this apply in other cases? If we did not want for
the service of the body the things of which we now stand in need, and
heat and cold and the other bodily sensations were unperceived by us,
there would be no use in this so-called wealth, if no one, that is,
had any necessity for those things which now make us wish for wealth in
order that we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in respect
of our various wants. And therefore if the possession of wealth is
useful in ministering to our bodily wants, and bodily wants were unknown
to us, we should not need wealth, and possibly there would be no such
thing as wealth.
ERYXIAS: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what
is useful to this end?
Eryxias once more gave his assent, but the small argument considerably
troubled him.
SOCRATES: And what is your opinion about another question:--Would you
say that the same thing can be at one time useful and at another useless
for the production of the same result?
ERYXIAS: I cannot say more than that if we require the same thing to
produce the same result, then it seems to me to be useful; if not, not.
SOCRATES: Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen statue,
we should not want fire for that purpose; and if we did not want it, it
would be useless to us? And the argument applies equally in other cases.
ERYXIAS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And therefore conditions which are not required for the
existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?
ERYXIAS: Of course not.
SOCRATES: And if without gold or silver or anything else which we do
not use directly
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