tter
whether true or false, which enable the user of them to prove that the
wisest and the richest are one and the same, although he is in the wrong
and his opponents are in the right. There would be nothing strange in
this; it would be as if two persons were to dispute about letters, one
declaring that the word Socrates began with an S, the other that it
began with an A, and the latter could gain the victory over the former.

Eryxias glanced at the audience, laughing and blushing at once, as if
he had had nothing to do with what had just been said, and replied,--No,
indeed, Socrates, I never supposed that our arguments should be of a
kind which would never convince any one of those here present or be of
advantage to them. For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that
the wisest and the richest are the same? The truth is that we are
discussing the subject of riches, and my notion is that we should
argue respecting the honest and dishonest means of acquiring them, and,
generally, whether they are a good thing or a bad.

Very good, I said, and I am obliged to you for the hint: in future we
will be more careful. But why do not you yourself, as you introduced the
argument, and do not think that the former discussion touched the point
at issue, tell us whether you consider riches to be a good or an evil?

I am of opinion, he said, that they are a good. He was about to add
something more, when Critias interrupted him:--Do you really suppose so,
Eryxias?

Certainly, replied Eryxias; I should be mad if I did not: and I do not
fancy that you would find any one else of a contrary opinion.

And I, retorted Critias, should say that there is no one whom I could
not compel to admit that riches are bad for some men. But surely, if
they were a good, they could not appear bad for any one?

Here I interposed and said to them: If you two were having an argument
about equitation and what was the best way of riding, supposing that I
knew the art myself, I should try to bring you to an agreement. For
I should be ashamed if I were present and did not do what I could
to prevent your difference. And I should do the same if you were
quarrelling about any other art and were likely, unless you agreed on
the point in dispute, to part as enemies instead of as friends. But now,
when we are contending about a thing of which the usefulness continues
during the whole of life, and it makes an enormous difference whether we
are to regard it as