n
tribes, there have been no military operations on the Indian frontier
since the Terai campaign was brought to a close in 1898. But signs are,
unfortunately, not wanting of a serious recrudescence of restlessness on
the North-West Frontier, where the very necessary measures taken to cut
off supplies of arms from the Persian Gulf have contributed to stimulate
the chronic turbulence of the unruly tribesmen. There is no definite
evidence at present that they are receiving direct encouragement from
Cabul, but it is at least doubtful whether the somewhat exaggerated
deference shown to the Ameer on the occasion of his visit three years
ago to India has permanently improved our relations with him, and though
he is no longer able to play off Russia and England against each other,
he has not yet brought himself to signify his adhesion to the Convention
which defined our understanding with Russia in regard to Afghan affairs.
The condition of Persia, and especially of the southern provinces, has
created a situation which cannot be indefinitely tolerated, whilst the
provocative temper displayed by the Turkish authorities under the new
_regime_ at various points on the Persian Gulf is only too well
calculated to produce unpleasant complications, however anxious we must
be to avoid them, if only in view of the feeling which any estrangement
between Mahomedan Powers and Great Britain inevitably produces amongst
Indian Moslems. The high-handed action of China in Tibet, and, indeed,
all along the north-eastern borderland of our Indian Empire, has
introduced a fresh element of potential trouble which the Government of
India cannot safely disregard, for we are bound not only to protect our
own frontiers, but also to safeguard the interests of Nepal and Bhutan,
where, as well as in Sikkim, the fate of Tibet and the flight of the
Dalai Lama have caused no slight perturbation. In Nepal especially,
which is one of the most valuable recruiting grounds of the Indian Army,
Chinese ascendency cannot be allowed to overshadow British influence.
Lord Hardinge is by profession a peacemaker, and how efficient a
peacemaker he proved himself to be at St. Petersburg during the
Russo-Japanese war will only be fully known when the historian has
access to the secret records of that critical period of Anglo-Russian
relations. But it must not be forgotten that the maintenance of peace
along such a vast and still largely unsettled borderland as that of
India m