e alone among the European Powers (except the peculiar case of Russia)
is expectant of an increase of power both in Europe and other
continents.

In the long run Germany will, like France, discover that under existing
conditions an aggressive colonial and aggressive European policy are
incompatible. The more important her colonies become and the larger her
oceanic commerce, the more Germany lays herself open to injury from a
strong maritime power, and the more hostages she is giving for good
behavior in Europe. Unless a nation controls the sea, colonies are from
a military point of view a source of weakness. The colonizing nation is
in the position of a merchant who increases his business by means of a
considerable increase of his debts. His use of the borrowed capital may
be profitable, but none the less he makes his standing at the time of an
emergency much more precarious. In the same way colonies add to the
responsibilities of a nation and scatter its military resources; and a
nation placed in such a situation is much less likely to break the
peace.

The economic and political development of Asia and Africa by the
European Powers is in its infancy; and no certain predictions can be
made as to its final effects upon the political relations among
civilized nations. Many important questions in respect thereto remain
ambiguous. What, for instance, are the limits of a practicable policy of
colonial expansion? In view of her peculiar economic condition and her
threatened decrease in population have those limits been transgressed by
France? Have they been transgressed by Great Britain? Considering the
enormous increase in British responsibilities imposed by the maritime
expansion of Germany, will not Great Britain be obliged to adopt a
policy of concentration rather than expansion? Is not her partial
retirement from American waters the first step in such a policy? Is not
the Japanese alliance a dubious device for the partial shifting of
burdens too heavy to bear? How long can Great Britain afford to maintain
her existing control of the sea? Is there any way of ending such a
control save either by the absolute exhaustion of Great Britain or by
the establishment of a stable international system under adequate
guarantees? Will the economic development of Asia lead to the awakening
of other Asiatic states like Japan, and the re-arrangement of
international relations for the purpose of giving them their appropriate
places? A