ions with England." This implied that England was
to be shut out from Continental politics, and that France was to
regulate the affairs of central and southern Europe. This observance
of the letter was, however, less rigid where French colonial and
maritime interests were at stake. Dextrous feelers were put forth
seawards, and it was only when these were repulsed that the French
negotiators encased themselves in their preliminaries.
The task of reducing those articles to a definitive treaty devolved,
on the British side, on the Marquis Cornwallis, a gouty, world-weary
old soldier, chiefly remembered for the surrender which ended the
American War. Nevertheless, he had everywhere won respect for his
personal probity in the administration of Indian affairs, and there
must also have been some convincing qualities in a personality which
drew from Napoleon at St. Helena the remark: "I do not believe that
Cornwallis was a man of first-rate abilities: but he had talent, great
probity, sincerity, and never broke his word.... He was a man of
honour--a true Englishman."
Against Lord Cornwallis, and his far abler secretary, Mr. Merry, were
pitted Joseph Bonaparte and his secretaries. The abilities of the
eldest of the Bonapartes have been much underrated. Though he lacked
the masterful force and wide powers of his second brother, yet at
Luneville Joseph proved himself to be an able diplomatist, and later
on in his tenure of power at Naples and Madrid he displayed no small
administrative gifts. Moreover, his tact and kindliness kindled in all
who knew him a warmth of friendship such as Napoleon's sterner
qualities rarely inspired. The one was loved as a man: for the other,
even his earlier acquaintances felt admiration and devotion, but
always mingled with a certain fear of the demi-god that would at times
blaze forth. This was the dread personality that urged Talleyrand and
Joseph Bonaparte to their utmost endeavours and steeled them against
any untoward complaisance at Amiens.
The selection of so honourable a man as Cornwallis afforded no slight
guarantee for the sincerity of our Government, and its sincerity will
stand the test of a perusal of its despatches. Having examined all
those that deal with these negotiations, the present writer can affirm
that the official instructions were in no respect modified by the
secret injunctions: these referred merely to such delicate and
personal topics as the evacuation of Hanover by P
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