rished--some fifteen or twenty--and two hundred banished,
so that the Republic might profit by that event to purge itself."

This was the policy now openly followed. In vain did some members of
the usually obsequious Council object to this summary procedure.
Roederer, Boulay, even the Second Consul himself, now perceived how
trifling was their influence when they attempted to modify Bonaparte's
plans, and two sections of the Council speedily decided that there
should be a military commission to judge suspects and "deport"
dangerous persons, and that the Government should announce this to
the Senate, Corps Legislatif, and Tribunate. Public opinion,
meanwhile, was carefully trained by the official "Moniteur," which
described in detail various so-called anarchist attempts; but an
increasing number in official circles veered round to Fouche's belief
that the outrage was the work of the royalists abetted by England. The
First Consul himself, six days after the event, inclined to this
version. Nevertheless, at a full meeting of the Council of State, on
the first day of the year 1801, he brought up a list of "130 villains
who were troubling the public peace," with a view to inflicting
summary punishment on them. Thibaudeau, Boulay, and Roederer haltingly
expressed their fears that all the 130 might not be guilty of the
recent outrage, and that the Council had no powers to decide on the
proscription of individuals. Bonaparte at once assured them that he
was not consulting them about the fate of individuals, but merely to
know whether they thought an exceptional measure necessary. The
Government had only

"Strong presumptions, not proofs, that the terrorists were the
authors of this attempt. _Chouannerie_ and emigration are surface
ills, terrorism is an internal disease. The measure ought to be
taken independently of the event. It is only the occasion of it. We
banish them (the terrorists) for the massacres of September 2nd,
May 31st, the Babeuf plot, and every subsequent attempt."[169]

The Council thereupon unanimously affirmed the need of an exceptional
measure, and adopted a suggestion of Talleyrand (probably emanating
from Bonaparte) that the Senate should be invited to declare by a
special decision, called a _senatus consultum_, whether such an act
were "preservative of the constitution." This device, which avoided
the necessity of passing a law through two less subservient bodies,
the