ear, namely,
from Switzerland. The importance of this immensely strong central
position early attracted Bonaparte's attention. On the 17th of March
he called his secretary, Bourrienne (so the latter states), and lay
down with him on a map of Piedmont: then, placing pins tipped, some
with red, others with black wax, so as to denote the positions of the
troops, he asked him to guess where the French would beat their foes:

"How the devil should I know?" said Bourrienne. "Why, look here,
you fool," said the First Consul: "Melas is at Alessandria with his
headquarters. There he will remain until Genoa surrenders. He has
at Alessandria his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, his
reserves. Crossing the Alps here (at the Great St. Bernard), I
shall fall upon Melas, cut off his communications with Austria, and
meet him here in the plains of the River Scrivia at San Giuliano."

I quote this passage as showing how readily such stories of ready-made
plans gain credence, until they come to be tested by Napoleon's
correspondence. There we find no strategic soothsaying, but only a
close watching of events as they develop day by day. In March and
April he kept urging on Moreau the need of an early advance, while he
considered the advantages offered by the St. Gotthard, Simplon, and
Great St. Bernard passes for his own army. On April 27th he decided
against the first (except for a detachment), because Moreau's advance
was too slow to safeguard his rear on that route. He now preferred the
Great St. Bernard, but still doubted whether, after crossing, he
should make for Milan, or strike at Massena's besiegers, in case that
general should be very hard pressed. Like all great commanders, he
started with a general plan, but he arranged the details as the
situation required. In his letter of May 19th, he poured scorn on
Parisian editors who said he prophesied that in a month he would be at
Milan. "That is not in my character. Very often I do _not_ say what I
know: but never do I say what will be."

The better to hide his purpose, he chose as his first base of
operations the city of Dijon, whence he seemed to threaten either the
Swabian or the Italian army of his foes. But this was not enough. At
the old Burgundian capital he assembled his staff and a few regiments
of conscripts in order to mislead the English and Austrian spies;
while the fighting battalions were drafted by diverse routes to Geneva
o