regarded as
due solely to his genius.[39] For, when Beaulieu had thrust his column
into the broken coast district between Genoa and Voltri, he severed it
dangerously far from his centre, which marched up the valley of the
eastern branch of the Bormida to occupy the passes of the Apennines
north of Savona. This, again, was by no means in close touch with the
Sardinian allies encamped further to the west in and beyond Ceva.
Beaulieu, writing at a later date to Colonel Graham, the English
_attache_ at his headquarters, ascribed his first disasters to
Argenteau, his lieutenant at Montenotte, who employed only a third of
the forces placed under his command. But division of forces was
characteristic of the Austrians in all their operations, and they now
gave a fine opportunity to any enterprising opponent who should crush
their weak and unsupported centre. In obedience to orders from Vienna,
Beaulieu assumed the offensive; but he brought his chief force to bear
on the French vanguard at Voltri, which he drove in with some loss.
While he was occupying Voltri, the boom of cannon echoing across the
mountains warned his outposts that the real campaign was opening in
the broken country north of Savona.[40] There the weak Austrian centre
had occupied a ridge or plateau above the village of Montenotte,
through which ran the road leading to Alessandria and Milan.
Argenteau's attack partly succeeded: but the stubborn bravery of a
French detachment checked it before the redoubt which commanded the
southern prolongation of the heights named Monte-Legino.[41]
Such was the position of affairs when Bonaparte hurried up. On the
following day (April 12th), massing the French columns of attack
under cover of an early morning mist, he moved them to their
positions, so that the first struggling rays of sunlight revealed to
the astonished Austrians the presence of an army ready to crush their
front and turn their flanks. For a time the Imperialists struggled
bravely against the superior forces in their front; but when Massena
pressed round their right wing, they gave way and beat a speedy
retreat to save themselves from entire capture. Bonaparte took no
active share in the battle: he was, very properly, intent on the wider
problem of severing the Austrians from their allies, first by the
turning movement of Massena, and then by pouring other troops into the
gap thus made. In this he entirely succeeded. The radical defects in
the Austrian disp
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