ge to the account of his fortune.
Strengthening Augereau's division by light troops, he captured the
whole of Provera's army at La Favorita, near the walls of Mantua
(January 16th). The natural result of these two dazzling triumphs was
the fall of the fortress for which the Emperor Francis had risked and
lost five armies. Wuermser surrendered Mantua on February 2nd with
18,000 men and immense supplies of arms and stores. The close of this
wondrous campaign was graced by an act of clemency. Generous terms
were accorded to the veteran marshal, whose fidelity to blundering
councillors at Vienna had thrown up in brilliant relief the prudence,
audacity, and resourcefulness of the young war-god.
It was now time to chastise the Pope for his support of the enemies of
France. The Papalini proved to be contemptible as soldiers. They fled
before the republicans, and a military promenade brought the invaders
to Ancona, and then inland to Tolentino, where Pius VI. sued for
peace. The resulting treaty signed at that place (February 19th)
condemned the Holy See to close its ports to the allies, especially to
the English; to acknowledge the acquisition of Avignon by France, and
the establishment of the Cispadane Republic at Bologna, Ferrara, and
the surrounding districts; to pay 30,000,000 francs to the French
Government; and to surrender 100 works of art to the victorious
republicans.
It is needless to describe the remaining stages in Bonaparte's
campaign against Austria. Hitherto he had contended against fairly
good, though discontented and discouraged troops, badly led, and
hampered by the mountain barrier which separated them from their real
base of operations. In the last part of the war he fought against
troops demoralized by an almost unbroken chain of disasters. The
Austrians were now led by a brave and intelligent general, the
Archduke Charles; but he was hampered by rigorous instructions from
Vienna, by senile and indolent generals, by the indignation or despair
of the younger officers at the official favouritism which left them in
obscurity, and by the apathy of soldiers who had lost heart. Neither
his skill nor the natural strength of their positions in Friuli and
Carinthia could avail against veterans flushed with victory and
marshalled with unerring sagacity. The rest of the war only served to
emphasize the truth of Napoleon's later statement, that the moral
element constitutes three-fourths of an army's strength. The
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