he first plan was beset by grave
dangers: the entrance to the harbour of Alexandria, when sounded,
proved to be most difficult for large ships--such was his judgment and
that of Villeneuve and Casabianca--and the exit could be blocked by a
single English battleship. As regards the alternatives of Aboukir or
Corfu, Brueys went on to state: "My firm desire is to be useful to you
in every possible way: and, as I have already said, every post will
suit me well, provided that you placed me there in an active way." By
this rather ambiguous phrase it would seem that he scouted the
alternative of Corfu as consigning him to a degrading inactivity;
while at Aboukir he held that he could be actively useful in
protecting the rear of the army. In that bay he therefore anchored his
largest ships, trusting that the dangers of the approach would screen
him from any sudden attack, but making also special preparations in
case he should be compelled to fight at anchor.[105] His decision was
probably less sound than that of Bonaparte, who, while marching to
Cairo, and again during his sojourn there, ordered him to make for
Corfu or Toulon; for the general saw clearly that the French fleet,
riding in safety in those well-protected roadsteads, would really
dominate the Mediterranean better than in the open expanse of Aboukir.
But these orders did not reach the admiral before the blow fell; and
it is, after all, somewhat ungenerous to censure Brueys for his
decision to remain at Aboukir and risk a fight rather than comply with
the dictates of a prudent but inglorious strategy.
The British admiral, after sweeping the eastern Mediterranean, at last
found the French fleet in Aboukir Bay, about ten miles from the
Rosetta mouth of the Nile. It was anchored under the lee of a shoal
which would have prevented any ordinary admiral from attacking,
especially at sundown. But Nelson, knowing that the head ship of the
French was free to swing at anchor, rightly concluded that there must
be room for British ships to sail between Brueys' stationary line and
the shallows. The British captains thrust five ships between the
French and the shoal, while the others, passing down the enemy's line
on the seaward side, crushed it in detail; and, after a night of
carnage, the light of August 2nd dawned on a scene of destruction
unsurpassed in naval warfare. Two French ships of the line and two
frigates alone escaped: one, the gigantic "Orient," had blown up with
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