n up troops and supplies from the rear, he pushes
on to end the campaign.

Barclay was still for retreat; but religious sentiment and patriotism
bade the defenders stand firm behind those crumbling walls, while
Bagration secured the line of retreat. The French, ranged
around on the low hills which ring it on the south, looked for an easy
triumph, and Napoleon seems to have felt an excess of confidence. At
any rate, his dispositions were far from masterly. He made no serious
effort to threaten the Russian communications with Moscow, nor did he
wait for his artillery to overwhelm the ramparts and their defenders.
The corps of Ney, Davoust, and Poniatowski, with Murat's cavalry and
the Imperial Guard posted in reserve, promised an easy victory, and
the dense columns of foot moved eagerly to the assault. They were
received with a terrific fire. Only after three hours' desperate
fighting did they master the southern suburbs, and at nightfall the
walls still defied their assaults. Yet in the meantime Napoleon's
cannon had done their work. The wooden houses were everywhere on fire;
a speedy retreat alone could save the garrison from ruin; and amidst a
whirlwind of flame and smoke Barclay drew off his men to join
Bagration on the road to Moscow (August 17th).

Once more, then, the Russian army had slipped from Napoleon's grasp,
though this time it dealt him a loss of 12,000 in killed or wounded.
And the momentous question faced him whether he should halt, now that
summer was on the wane, or snatch under the walls of Moscow the
triumph which Vilna, Vitepsk, and Smolensk had promised and denied. It
is stated by that melodramatic narrator, Count Philip Segur, that on
entering Vitepsk, the Emperor exclaimed: "The campaign of 1812 is
ended, that of 1813 will do the rest." But the whole of Napoleon's
"Correspondence" refutes the anecdote. Besides, it was not Napoleon's
habit to go into winter quarters in July, or to rest before he had
defeated the enemy's main army.[264]

At Smolensk the question wore another aspect. Napoleon told Metternich
at Dresden that he would not in the present year advance beyond
Smolensk, but would organize Lithuania during winter and advance again
in the spring of 1813, adding: "My enterprise is one of those of which
the solution is to be found in patience." A policy of masterly
inactivity certainly commended itself to his Marshals. But the desire
to crush the enemy's rear drew Ney and Murat into a sharp