ampling on Prussia; if, instead of intriguing with the
Sultan and the Shah, and thus reawakening our fears respecting Egypt
and India, he had called a Congress and submitted all the present
disputes to general discussion, there is reason to think that Great
Britain would have received his overtures. George III.'s Ministers had
favoured the proposal of a Congress when put forward by Austria in the
spring;[159] and they would doubtless have welcomed it from Napoleon
after Friedland, had they not known of far-reaching plans which
rendered peace more risky than open war. This great genius had, in
fact, one fatal defect; he had little faith except in outward
compulsion; and his superabundant energy of menace against England
blighted the hopes of peace which he undoubtedly cherished.

Long before Alexander's offer of mediation was forwarded to London,
our Ministers had taken a sudden and desperate resolution. They
determined to compel Denmark to join England and Sweden, and to hold
the fleet at Copenhagen as a gauge of Danish fidelity.

That momentous resolve was formed on or just before July the 16th, in
consequence of news that had arrived from Memel and Tilsit. The exact
purport of that news, and the manner of its acquisition, have been one
of the puzzles of modern history. But the following facts seem to
furnish a solution. Our Foreign Office Records show that our agent at
Tilsit, Mr. Mackenzie, who was on confidential terms with General
Bennigsen, left post haste for England immediately after the first
imperial interview; and the news which he brought, together with
reports of the threatening moves of the French on Holstein, clinched
the determination of our Government to checkmate the Franco-Russian
aims by bringing strong pressure to bear on Denmark. To keep open the
mouth of the Baltic was an urgent necessity, otherwise we should lose
touch with the Anglo-Swedish forces campaigning against the French
near Stralsund.[160] Furthermore, it should be noted that Denmark held
the balance in naval affairs. France and her allies now had fifty-nine
sail of the line ready for sea: the compact with the Czar would give
her twenty-four more; and if Napoleon seized the eighteen Danish and
nine Portuguese battleships, his fighting strength would be nearly
equal to our own.[161] Canning therefore determined, on July 16th, to
compel Denmark to side with us, or at least to observe a neutrality
favourable to the British cause; and, to