if you are convinced as men, that it is right, when
properly understood, but you must not take one piece of this
instruction and consider it, when the Supreme Court in passing upon
a set of instructions never takes one by itself, but considers one
in the light of all the others. So you must consider these
instructions in the light of each other."

The counsel proceeded to read at extreme length from "Wells on
Circumstantial Evidence," with the view of showing the
unreliability of such testimony. Burrill's work on the same subject
was also considered.

He next read a decision of the Supreme Court, which, in effect,
declares that a verdict of guilty can only be arrived at when there
is no reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the
person charged, even though at the same time the only solution of
the crime is the theory of the guilt of the defendant. The life and
liberty of the citizen can not be sacrificed on the ground that
only by regarding him as guilty can the crime be explained. Mr.
Forrest then quoted a case showing that where a physical
possibility existed of the crime being committed by some other
means than that claimed in the theory of the guilt of the
defendant, the supposition of his innocence was not to be excluded
on the ground of its moral impossibility.

[Illustration: W. S. FORREST, LEADING COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE.]

An adjournment was taken at this point until 10 o'clock Monday
morning, December 9, when Mr. Forrest resumed his address to the
jury.

He began with an apology for his discussion of the question of law
on Saturday, stating that he thought it was his duty to do so. Then
he went on to argue that witnesses may lie, but facts can not. He
took a peculiar line on this point, referring to the tariff
discussion, and showing that the Republicans claimed that the
tariff is a benefit to the country, and that the Democrats claimed
the opposite. "So you see," continued counsel, "much depends upon
the disposition you have when you start to look at facts." He then
read from "Taylor on the Law of Evidence," citing a case in which
Macbeth was quoted to show that the smearing of the daggers was an
intentional effort to create circumstantial evidence against the
innocent. The decision also referred to Joseph's