g our
steps and abandoning the expedition. It was urged, however,
(and with some propriety, too,) that inasmuch as I had
abandoned a similar expedition only a few weeks before and
given as my reasons for so doing, the "utter and entire
destitution of the country," and that in the face of this we
were again sent through the same country, it would be
ruinous on all sides to return again without first meeting
the enemy. Moreover, from all the information General
Washburn had acquired, there _could be no considerable_
force in our front and all my own information led to the
same conclusion. To be sure my information was exceedingly
meagre and unsatisfactory and had I returned I would have
been totally unable to present any facts to justify my
cause, or to show why the expedition might not have been
successfully carried forward. All I could have presented
would have been my conjectures as to what the enemy would
naturally do under the circumstances and these would have
availed but little against the idea that the enemy was
scattered and had no considerable force in our front.

"Under these circumstances, and with a sad forboding of the
consequences, I determined to move forward; keeping my force
as compact as possible and ready for action at all times;
hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if we did
not, yet our losses might at most be insignificant in
comparison with the great benefits which might accrue to
General Sherman by the depletion of Johnson's army to so
large an extent.

"On the evening of the 8th, one day beyond Ripley, I
assembled the commanders of infantry brigades at the
headquarters of Colonel McMillen, and cautioned them as to
the necessity of enforcing rigid discipline in their camps;
keeping their troops always in hand and ready to act on a
moment's notice. That it was impossible to gain any accurate
or reliable information of the enemy, and that it behooved
us to move and act constantly as though in his presence.
That we were now where we might encounter him at any moment,
and that we must under no circumstances allow ourselves to
be surprised. On the morning of the 10th, the cavalry
marched at half-past 5 o'clock and the infantry at seven,
thus allowing the infantry to follow immediately in rea