s
force was then in our rear. The rear of Curtis's Army was in a great deal
of confusion; its trains were stretched out on the Fayetteville road and
the ground that we were upon was wooded and not very defensible for a
battle, unless they attacked us on the Sugar Creek front.

While we were in this council, about 8:30 a. m., scattered firing
commenced in our rear near the Elkhorn Tavern, and General Curtis inquired
what it was, and asked what troops those were that were out upon the
road. I answered that they were mine, and he ordered Colonel Carr to
immediately send me to the Elkhorn Tavern and ascertain what the firing
meant.

Colonel Carr evidently was of the same opinion as myself, and accompanied
me as I moved as rapidly as possible to the Elkhorn Tavern, where we went
without being deployed right into battle; in fact, right into the enemy's
skirmishers. The fact is, the first notice I had that the battle was on
was when a shell fell among my drummers and fifers, who were at the head
of my Regiment, and killed and demoralized them, so that we heard no more
of drumming and fifing that day. I immediately deployed a company of the
Fourth Iowa, which had been thoroughly drilled as skirmishers, and pushed
forward toward the White River road, seeing some teams of the enemy
passing that way with forage, and I pushed down the slopes of the Cross
Timber Hollows nearly a mile before I developed the enemy in force.

The firing of the artillery and the sharp skirmish firing of my movement
satisfied Colonel Carr that the enemy was in force in my front, and he
immediately sent back word for his other Brigade, Commanded by Colonel
Vandever, of the Ninth Iowa Infantry, to come to the rear, now our front.
They had hardly reached the Elkhorn Tavern and deployed into line before
Price's whole Army moved in on us in line of battle and disabled two of
our batteries. The fighting on this front, with only Carr's two Brigades
in line, the strength of both not exceeding three thousand men, was kept
up continuously all day, until dark, with varying success.

As soon as I saw, near the middle of the day, the formation of the enemy,
I knew that I could not hold the extended line we were covering, and I
commenced drawing in my right and closing on Vandever until I backed down
through an open field that had been cleared, and where the logs had been
hauled to the lower edge of the slope to make a fence. Behind these logs I
placed my Brigade a