American case and an appeal for the
interposition of his imperial majesty, "the liberator and pacifier of
Europe." From the interview Mr. Gallatin learned that the emperor had
made three attempts in the interest of peace, but that he had no hope
that his representations had been of any service. England would not
admit a third party to interfere, and he thought that, with respect to
the conditions of peace, the difficulty would be with England and not
with America.

On June 13 Gallatin warned Monroe of the preparations England was making
which would enable her to land fifteen to twenty thousand men on the
Atlantic coast; that the capture of Washington and New York would most
gratify the British people, and that no help need be expected from the
countries of Europe, all which were profoundly desirous of peace.

The ministry informing Mr. Gallatin that the British commissioners would
start for Ghent on July 1, he improved the interval by a visit to Paris.
He left London, where he had passed nearly three months in the uncertain
preliminaries of negotiation, and after a few days in the French capital
reached Ghent on July 6. The British commissioners only appeared on
August 6. They were Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and William Adams, all
second-rate men, but for this reason suited to the part they had to
play. After the overturn of Napoleon the British cabinet had no desire
for peace, or at least not until they had secured by war some material
advantages in the United States, which a treaty would confirm. The
business of their representatives at Ghent was to make exorbitant
demands of the Americans and delay negotiations pending the military
operations in progress.

In June Gallatin was satisfied of the general hostile spirit of Great
Britain and of its wish to inflict serious injury on the United States.
He notified Monroe of his opinion and warned him that the most favorable
terms to be expected were the _status ante bellum_, and not certainly
that, unless the American people were united and the country able to
stand the shock of the campaign. Mr. Madison's administration had
already humbled itself to an abandonment, or at least to an adjournment,
of the principle to establish which they had resorted to arms. But in
the first stages of the negotiation it was clear that the British
cabinet had more serious and dangerous objects in view, and looked
beyond aggression and temporary injury to permanent objects. At the
first