the evil we
overcome, we should say that peace had been bought at too high a
price. _Terrible as war is, it cannot be judged by itself alone._ We
have a right to look forward to a time when there shall be no more
war, just as everywhere it seems to be instinctive for us to try to
gain good without its attendant trouble and evil. In the meantime the
world had best busy itself, mainly, in our view, with creating those
things that are best, rather than in destroying those things that are
worst. Nations, like individuals, must lead bravely hazardous lives,
without too much thought of dangers. Peace as a sole program for the
making of history appears to be too narrow, and especially too
unproductive. Internationalism that is merely a combination of peoples
to prevent war is not very inspiring, especially since it is doubtful
whether it even leads to peace. A broad historical view that will
enable us just now to make good come out of the evil of war will be a
better organ of conscious evolution than a philosophy of peace can
possibly be.

Such views as these give us at least some clews to the educational and
pedagogical problems of war and peace. We can distinguish between an
education which deals specifically with such problems, endeavoring to
treat them sharply and with finality, making clear moral decisions,
and an education which by enriching the mind and by educating all the
selective faculties leads to an appreciation of all great practical
and moral questions as aspects of the whole of history and of life.

Let us see what the specific teaching of peace may and may not
include. First of all we cannot, for educational purposes, judge
everything in the lives of nations by _moral_ principles. The ideal of
universal brotherhood and cooeperation, of sacrifice and altruism,
cannot be realized in the present stage of history. On the other hand,
the stern picture of justice is one that fits into the present mood of
the world. Justice is the natural link between individualism and
altruism. A world determined upon seeing justice done, a world which,
without setting absolute values upon peace and war, does distinguish
between just and unjust wars, between the demands and the needs of
peoples, leans toward the moral life. It has little to say about
duties as yet, or comparatively little, but it has a strong conception
of rights. A deep enough interest in justice, by its own momentum,
introduces duties into the practical life. I