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uch publications be marked as such, the Court emphasized that these provisions were reasonably designed to safeguard the second-class privilege from exploitation by mere advertising publications. Chief Justice White warned that the Court by no means intended to imply that it endorsed the government's "broad contentions concerning the existence of arbitrary power through the classification of the mails, or by way of condition * * *"[1144] Again, in Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. _v._ Burleson,[1145] where the Court sustained an order of the Postmaster General excluding from the second-class privilege a newspaper which he found to have systematically published matter banned by the Espionage Act of 1917, the claim of absolute power in Congress to withhold this privilege was sedulously avoided. More recently, when reversing an order denying the second-class privilege to a mailable publication because of the poor taste and vulgarity of its contents, on the ground that the Postmaster General exceeding his statutory authority, Justice Douglas assumed, in the opinion of the Court, "that Congress has a broad power of classification and need not open second-class mail to publications of all types."[1146] THE EXCLUSION POWER AS AN ADJUNCT TO OTHER POWERS In the cases just reviewed the mails were closed to particular types of communication which were deemed to be harmful. A much broader power of exclusion was asserted in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.[1147] To induce compliance with the regulatory requirements of that act, Congress denied the privilege of using the mails for any purpose to holding companies which failed to obey that law, irrespective of the character of the material to be carried. Viewing the matter realistically, the Supreme Court treated this provision as a penalty. While it held this statute constitutional because the regulations whose infractions were thus penalized were themselves valid,[1148] it declared that "Congress may not exercise its control over the mails to enforce a requirement which lies outside its constitutional province, * * *."[1149] STATE REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE MAILS In determining the extent to which State laws may impinge upon persons or corporations whose services are utilized by Congress in executing its postal powers, the task of the Supreme Court has been to determine whether particular measures are consistent with the general policies indicated
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