atute, on
the other hand, which forbade the sale in any city of the State of any
beef, mutton, lamb, or pork which, had not been inspected on the hoof
by local inspectors within twenty-four hours of slaughter, was held
void.[918] Its "necessary operation," said the Court, was to ban from
the State wholesome and properly inspected meat from other States.[919]
Also a Virginia statute which required the inspection and labelling of
all flour brought into the State for sale was disallowed because flour
produced in the State was not subject to inspection;[920] likewise a
Florida statute providing for the inspection of all cement imported into
the State and enacting a fee therefor, but making no provision for the
inspection of the local product, met a like fate;[921] as did also a
Madison, Wisconsin ordinance which sought to exclude a foreign
corporation from selling milk in that city solely because its
pasteurization plants were more than five miles away.[922]

STATE PROHIBITION LAWS; THE ORIGINAL PACKAGE DOCTRINE

The original package doctrine made its debut in Brown _v._
Maryland,[923] where it was applied to remove imports from abroad which
were still in the hands of the importer in the original package, out of
the reach of the State's taxing power. This rule the Court, overriding a
dictum in Marshall's opinion in Brown _v._ Maryland,[924] rejected
outright after the Civil War as to imports from sister States.[925]
However, when in the late eighties and early nineties State-wide
Prohibition laws began making their appearance, the Court seized on the
rejected dictum and began applying it as a brake on the operation of
such laws with respect to interstate commerce in intoxicants, which the
Court denominated "legitimate articles of commerce." While holding that
a State was entitled to prohibit the manufacture and sale within its
limits of intoxicants,[926] even for an outside market--manufacture
being no part of commerce[927]--it contemporaneously laid down the rule,
in Bowman _v._ Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Co.,[928] that so long
as Congress remained silent in the matter, a State lacked the power,
even as part and parcel of a program of Statewide prohibition of the
traffic in intoxicants, to prevent the shipment into it of intoxicants
from a sister State; and this holding was soon followed by another to
the effect that, so long as Congress remained silent, a State had no
power to prevent the sale in the original pa