e is
any probability for or against the existence of the soul or of God,
though Kant was very anxious to show that it is our duty on moral
grounds to _believe_ very firmly in both. Now if Kant is right about
this, his result is tremendously important. If psychology and theology
are wholly devoid of scientific value, it is most desirable that we
should know this, not only that we may not waste time in studying them,
but because it may reasonably make a very great difference to the
practical ordering of our lives. If Kant can be proved wrong, it is
equally important to be convinced that he is wrong. We may have been led
by belief in his teaching to neglect the acquisition of a great deal of
knowledge of high intrinsic interest, and may even have been betrayed
into basing the conduct of life on wrong principles. If, for example, we
can really know something about the soul, it _may_ be possible to know
whether it is immortal or not, and it is not unreasonable to hold that
certain knowledge, or even probable belief, on such a point ought to
make a great difference to our choice between rival aims in life. There
is clearly much less to be said for the recommendation to 'eat and drink
for to-morrow we die' if we have reason to believe our souls immortal
than if we have not, and some of us do not share Mr. Russell's view that
Philosophy is called upon to abdicate what the Greeks thought her
sovereign function, the regulation of life. It is true that Kant
convinced himself that it is a moral duty to act as if we knew the truth
of doctrines for or against which we cannot detect the slightest balance
of probability. But the logically sound inference from Kant's premisses
would be that, to use Pascal's famous metaphor, a prudent man will do
well to bet neither for nor against immortality. Unfortunately, as
Pascal said, you can't _help_ betting; _il faut parier_. If it makes any
difference to the relative values of different goods whether the soul
dies with the body or not, one _must_ take sides in the matter. In
making one's choices one must prefer either the things it is reasonable
to regard as good for a creature whose days are threescore years and ten
or those which it is reasonable to regard as best for a being who is to
live for ever. The only way to escape having to bet is not to be born.

I come to the second problem, the one which, as I think, Mr. Russell
arbitrarily ignores. A human being is not a mere knowledge-machine. Th