o follow from M. Bergson's premisses, even if we had any reason, as
I do not see that we have, to accept the premisses. And as to the second
point, I would ask whether M. Bergson possesses a clock or a watch, and
if he has, how he supposes time is measured on them? He seems to me to
have forgotten the elementary fact that angles can be measured as well
as straight lines. (I might add that he makes the further curious
assumption that all geometry is metrical.) It may be that something
would be left of the Bergsonian philosophy if one eliminated the
consequences of these initial blunders, but I do not know what the
remainder would be. At any rate, the anti-intellectualism which M.
Bergson and his disciple, Professor Carr, seem to regard as fundamental
will have to go, unless different and better grounds can be found for
it. I must leave it to others to judge of the adequacy of this apology.

FOR REFERENCE

Varisco, _The Great Problem_ (Macmillan).

Varisco, _Know Thyself_ (Macmillan).

Aliotta, _The Idealistic Reaction against Science_ (Macmillan).

Bertrand Russell, _Our Knowledge of the External World_ (Open Court
Publishing Co.).

Bertrand Russell, _The Problems of Philosophy_ (Home University
Library).

A.N. Whitehead, _The Principles of Natural Knowledge_ (Cambridge Press).

G.E. Moore, _Ethics_ (H.U.L.).

W. McDougall, _Philosophy_ (H.U.L.).

A.N. Whitehead, _Introduction to Mathematics_ (H.U.L.).

III

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN THOUGHT ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION

F.B. JEVONS

The living beings that exist or have existed upon the earth are of kinds
innumerable; and, in the opinion of man, the chief of them all is
mankind. Man, for the simple reason that he is man, is anthropomorphic
in all his judgements and not merely in his religious conceptions; he
holds himself to be the standard and measure in all things. If his right
so to regard himself were challenged, if he were called upon to justify
himself for having taken his foot as a unit of measurement, or his
fingers as the basis of his system of numbers, he might reply that
anything will serve as a standard for weights and measures, provided
that it never varies, but is always the same whenever referred to. But
the reply, valid though it is, does not do full justice to man: it
leaves room for the suspicion that a standard is something chosen by man
in a purely arbitrary manner and without reference to the facts of
nature. If that