tion to other associations.

In considering both sets of problems, international and internal, we may
either begin with the division of the world into states, each of which
will be an approximation of _the_ State which we are studying, or we may
regard the whole world as in some sort one society, covered with a
network of overlapping associations of all kinds. On the former view the
world is thought of as consisting of a number of independent
communities, each shaping and controlling the various forms of social
life within its own borders, upholding their moral world, and each being
as a whole single entity a member of the community of states. On the
latter we start with the solidarity and will to co-operate which
pervades in all manner of degrees the whole world society, and regard
the organization of force which marks the state as being the mark of a
settled and determined form of that will to co-operate which is
characteristic of all forms of human association. How dominant and
determinant over other forms of association is that special form which
controls organized force--that is the problem before us. We are
concerned in technical language with the problem of sovereignty.

Let us consider first the problem of international relations. The
doctrine of sovereignty, formulated in the seventeenth century and
crystallized by Austin at the beginning of the nineteenth, made
sovereignty the hallmark of the state. The person or persons, to whom
the bulk of a given society render habitual obedience, either do or do
not render habitual obedience in turn to some other person or persons.
If they do not, the society constitutes a sovereign state; if they do,
it is only part of a sovereign state. The world therefore was regarded
as containing a number of sovereign independent states. As sovereignty
and law necessarily went hand in hand, there could be no law between
sovereign states. There could only be world-wide law if there were one
world-wide state. So long as there are more states than one, there are
communities between whom there is no law. The doctrine of sovereignty
was in its inception individualist, but in so far as concerns the
implications, though not the basis of sovereignty, it was taken over by
Hegel and by the English idealist school with the exception of T.H.
Green. Idealism, indeed, always insisted that will, not force, was the
basis of the state, but whereas in Green the state is constituted by the
moral willin