s of Marshal Foch, and the
facts and figures now given show how closely the great Frenchman was
informed and how "completely," to use Marshal Haig's word, his plans
were carried out. On the 3rd of October Hindenburg had written to
Prince Max of Baden, that "as a result ... of our complete inability
to fill up the gaps caused by the very heavy losses inflicted on us
during the recent battles, no hope is left ... of forcing the enemy to
make peace." How true this was is made plain by the details just
published. On September 25th--that is to say, the day before the
British attack on the Hindenburg line, and the French and American
attacks east and west of the Argonne--the Intelligence Department of
the French General Staff reported to Marshal Foch that since July
15th, in the Marne salient, at St. Mihiel, and in the British battles
of Amiens, Bapaume, and the Scarpe, the enemy had engaged 163
divisions. His reserves were reduced to 68 divisions--as against 81 in
July--and of these only 21 were fresh troops. The German line had been
shortened by 125 miles, but so weakened were the German Armies, that
the same number of divisions had to be kept in the line as before the
shortening--each division representing only some three-quarters of its
former strength, and 16 divisions having been broken up to fill the
ranks in those that remained.
_Following immediately on this report came the three converging
attacks of the Allies._ On October 9th the German Army, under British
pressure, abandoned the whole Hindenburg position, and entered upon a
general retreat from the North Sea to the Meuse. At that moment 44 of
the German divisions in line were not to be depended on for further
serious fighting, and there were only 22 divisions available to
replace them, of which 15 were of inferior quality, holding "quiet"
sectors. On October 11th the French Intelligence Bureau reported that
"it is impossible for the enemy, with the forces that he has at
present in line, to stop and face any considerable attack for an
appreciable time."
On October 4th, the day after Hindenburg's letter to Prince Max, the
German Chancellor cabled to President Wilson, asking for an Armistice.
_Already, on September 28th_, in the very midst of the British attack
on the Hindenburg line, and on the morrow of General Gouraud's and
General Pershing's first advances in Champagne and the Argonne, the
German Command had warned the Chancellor that this step must be taken
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