attle. "So great indeed became
the need for mounted men that certain units which had been dismounted
were hurriedly provided with horses and did splendid service.
Frequently when it was impossible to move forward other troops in time
our mounted troops were able to fill gaps in our line and restore the
situation." During the long trench battle of the middle years "the
absence of room for manoeuvre made the importance of cavalry less
apparent." But in the last stage of the struggle, when the Germans
"were falling back in disorganised masses," the moral effect of
British cavalry pressing on the heels of the enemy was "overwhelming,"
and had not the Armistice stopped the cavalry advance, it would have
turned the enemy's disorganised retreat "into a rout."
This is strong testimony, and will probably be stoutly fought by the
eager advocates of "mechanical contrivances." But Sir Douglas Haig
stands to it that no form of mechanical contrivance can ever either
make the cavalryman useless, or the infantryman, who is "the backbone
of defence and the spearhead of attack," less important. He admits,
indeed, fully that machine guns, tanks, aeroplanes, and motor
transport "have given a greater driving power to war," and that the
country which possesses most of such things has an advantage over its
opponents. But he insists that their only "real function" is to assist
the infantry to get to grips with their opponents, and that of
themselves "they cannot possibly obtain a decision." To imagine that
tanks and aeroplanes can ever take the place of infantry and cavalry
is to do these marvellous tools themselves a disservice by expecting
of them more than they can perform. "Only by the rifle and bayonet of
the infantry can the decisive victory be won." For, as the
Commander-in-Chief lays down no less strongly than this great French
colleague, Marshal Foch, "this war has given no new principles." But
it has greatly complicated the application of the old. Every new
invention makes the problem of co-operation--of interaction between
the different armies and services--more difficult and more imperative.
* * * * *
As to the artillery history of the war, the Field Marshal gives the
most amazing figures. When in 1916, at the suggestion of Mr.
Roosevelt, and by the wish of our Government, I went through some of
our leading munition districts, with a view to reporting what was
being done in them to England's fri
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