ophical proposition couched in terms we
do not understand, the most modest and charitable view is to assume
that this arises from our lack of knowledge. Nothing is easier than for
the ignorant to ridicule the propositions of the learned. And yet, with
every reserve, I cannot but feel that the disputes to which I have
alluded prove the necessity of bringing scientific precision of
language into the whole domain of thought. If the discussion had been
confined to a few, and other philosophers had analyzed the subject, and
showed the fictitious character of the discussion, or had pointed out
where opinions really might differ, there would be nothing derogatory
to philosophers. But the most suggestive circumstance is that although
a large proportion of the philosophic writers in recent times have
devoted more or less attention to the subject, few, or none, have made
even this modest contribution. I speak with some little confidence on
this subject, because several years ago I wrote to one of the most
acute thinkers of the country, asking if he could find in philosophic
literature any terms or definitions expressive of the three different
senses in which not only the word freedom, but nearly all words
implying freedom were used. His search was in vain.

Nothing of this sort occurs in the practical affairs of life. All terms
used in business, however general or abstract, have that well-defined
meaning which is the first requisite of the scientific language. Now
one important lesson which I wish to inculcate is that the language of
science in this respect corresponds to that of business; in that each
and every term that is employed has a meaning as well defined as the
subject of discussion can admit of. It will be an instructive exercise
to inquire what this peculiarity of scientific and business language
is. It can be shown that a certain requirement should be fulfilled by
all language intended for the discovery of truth, which is fulfilled
only by the two classes of language which I have described. It is one
of the most common errors of discourse to assume that any common
expression which we may use always conveys an idea, no matter what the
subject of discourse. The true state of the case can, perhaps, best be
seen by beginning at the foundation of things and examining under what
conditions language can really convey ideas.

Suppose thrown among us a person of well-developed intellect, but
unacquainted with a single languag