ence to Britain of
the Agar Khan, the immensely powerful ruler of millions of Indian
Mohammedans. The Agar Khan had spent many of the years previous to the
war in England in daily association with English high society and
official circles. At the outbreak of the war with Turkey, in October,
1914, at the request of the British Government, he visited Egypt, and
it was largely upon his advice that the former khedive was deposed and
the new one elevated to the post. Indeed, at one time there were
strong rumors, afterward energetically denied by the British
Government, that the Agar Khan had advised a Mohammedan repudiation of
the authority of the caliph and the elevation of another to his place
under a British guarantee. In support of this plan it was pointed out
that Great Britain, judged by the number of adherents under her rule,
was the world's greatest Mohammedan power. It was intolerable to many
English people, especially to those of strong imperialistic
tendencies, that the real control, even in theory, of so large and
important a section of the people of the British Empire should be in
Constantinople, safe from the "influence" and "persuasion" of the
British Government. By these people it was held that the sultan's
lineal claim was weak, and that an even better claim to the headship
of the Moslems could be established for any one of several other men
who might have been named. However, the plan was never achieved.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS OF FIRST SIX MONTHS OF TURKISH CAMPAIGN

What was the situation as a whole, so far as Turkey and her military
actions against the Allies were concerned, as to the outcome of these
various operations in three fields--the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, and
Egypt--during the first six months of the war? The military narrative
is recorded in the chapter following. It will be seen that all of them
were inconclusive. Indeed, from what we knew of the circumstances
surrounding them, all we are justified in saying is that none of them
was serious in the sense that they were not intended to have any
decisive effect, directly, upon the progress of the war. Of them all
it might be urged by a military authority that they were subsidiary
operations, dangerous and wasteful in that they withdrew valuable men,
munitions, brains, and energy from the decisive fronts. Their only
justification is that they imposed similar action on the part of both
armies, and so, in just that degree, scattered their for