ces. For the
Turk it can be urged that at least two of the campaigns were forced
upon him by his German mentors, while the third was imposed upon him
by a British offensive. Furthermore, the Turk was entirely cut off
from his Austro-German allies, and there was no possibility of his
bringing his weight to bear in one of the main fields. From that point
of view it is possible to justify the Turkish offensives as sound
strategy.

Aside from a desire to protect the oil supply in Persia, it is hardly
as easy to justify the British offensive in Mesopotamia. As events
subsequently demonstrated, it was possible for the Turks to throw an
overwhelming number of troops into Bagdad and to the south, and,
furthermore, they were fighting under vastly more advantageous
conditions than were the invaders. Only on the assumption that the
Turks were hopelessly demoralized and disorganized, and that as
fighting men they would belie all their past history, was it possible
to visualize success for the British operations in Mesopotamia.

Turkey had definitely come to grips with England and with Russia. She
had in none of these fields measured swords with France, although she
was equally at war with that country. The exact apportionment of the
actual work to be done by the individual powers of the Entente seems
to have led to considerable disagreement, and resulted at times in
serious delay. Such arrangements depend, of course, upon each
country's idea of its spheres of influence. Obviously, no country, if
it can help it, is going to waste its men or its efforts in a field in
which it has only a minor political or commercial interest. So far as
France was concerned, the Caucasus, Egypt--aside from the possibility
of the closing of the canal--and Mesopotamia were not of enough
importance to justify her in participating in the struggle with the
Turks even were it physically possible. All these remarks, of course,
are subject to modifications imposed by considerations of the larger
strategy of the Entente Powers; but for many months of the war the
agreement of the Entente Powers in the matter of general strategy was
conspicuous by its absence.

With her neighbors in the Balkans Turkey had maintained remarkably
good relations considering the bitterness engendered, not only by
centuries of strife, but by the recent events of the two Balkan wars.
Bulgaria, smarting under the loss of territory through the attack upon
her by Serbia, Greece, and R