es of Belgium,
France, and England, and feared an offensive on the part of the
Russian army.
Across the great isthmus separating the Caspian and Black Seas run the
Caucasus Mountains. Parallel to this range of towering mountains, the
highest in Europe, runs the frontier line of Russia and Turkey and
Russia and Persia, winding in and out among the Trans-Caucasian
Mountains. About two hundred miles from the Russo-Turkish frontier
stands Tiflis, the rich and ancient capital of Georgia, and one of the
prime objectives of any Turkish offensive. One of the few railroads of
this wild country runs from Tiflis through the Russian fortress of
Kars, forty-five miles from the Turkish frontier, to Sarikamish,
thirty miles nearer. On the Turkish side the fortress of Erzerum
stands opposed to Kars, but suffering in comparison by the lack of
railroad communication with the interior of Turkey.
Despite all these discouraging circumstances, however, the Turkish
General Staff, dominated by the indefatigable and ambitious Enver
Pasha, was not to be deterred. A brilliant and daring plan of
campaign, aiming at the annihilation or capture of the entire Russian
Caucasian army, the seizure of Kars and Tiflis, and the control of the
immensely valuable and important Caspian oil fields, was prepared. The
unwelcome task of carrying this plan to completion and success was
intrusted to Hassan Izzet Pasha, under the general guidance of Enver
Pasha and his staff of German advisers.
The heroic efforts of the Turkish troops, their grim but hopeless
battle against equally brave troops, appalling weather conditions, and
insuperable obstacles, their failure and defeat when on the very verge
of complete success, make an intensely interesting story.
Stationed at Erzerum, Turkey had the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Corps.
In addition, the Thirty-seventh Arab division had been brought up from
Bagdad to strengthen the Eleventh Corps. At Trebizond two divisions of
the First Corps had been brought from Constantinople by sea. These
forces totaled about 140,000 troops. At and about Kars, General
Woronzov, the Russian commander, had between 100,000 and 110,000
troops at his disposal from first to last. But although weaker in
numbers he had the inestimable advantage of operating with a line of
railroad at his back, whereas the Turkish commander had to depend
entirely upon road transit, 500 miles from the nearest railroad.
The conditions absolutely necessary fo
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