t, as Jefferson said, completely
reversed all the political relations of the United States. Hitherto,
from the Republican point of view, France had been our natural friend.
Henceforth, as the possessor of New Orleans, through which three eighths
of the produce of the West passed to market, she became a natural and
habitual enemy. "France placing herself in that door," wrote Jefferson
to Livingston, "assumes to us the attitude of defiance. The impetuosity
of her temper, the energy and restlessness of her character, placed in a
point of eternal friction with us, and our character, ... these
circumstances render it impossible that France and the United States can
continue long friends when they meet in so irritable a position.... The
day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which
is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union
of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of
the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet
and nation."

Even as he expressed his apprehensions to Livingston, then Minister to
France, Jefferson suggested ways and means for averting the clash of
conflicting interests. If France was bent on possessing and holding
Louisiana, might she not make concessions for the sake of retaining the
friendship of the United States? Livingston was to sound the French
Government to ascertain whether it would entertain the idea of ceding
the Island of New Orleans and the Floridas. "We should consider New
Orleans and the Floridas as equivalent for the risk of a quarrel with
France produced by her vicinage," he assured Livingston.

What the Western world had to fear from the French occupation of
Louisiana appeared in November, 1802, when Governor Claiborne, of the
Mississippi Territory, reported that the right of deposit at New Orleans
had been withdrawn. The act, to be sure, was that of the Spanish
intendant, but every one believed that it had been incited by France.
The people of the Western waters, particularly in Tennessee and
Kentucky, were outraged and demanded instant war against the aggressor.
Even in Congress a war party raised its head. During all this popular
clamor the self-restraint of the Administration was admirable. The
annual message ignored the existence of the war party and referred to
the cession of Louisiana in colorless language worthy of Talleyrand.

The Administration was not, however, without a