were
skillfully conducted chiefly by Jacob Thompson and C. C. Clay. The
reports of these agents throughout the spring and summer were all
hopeful and told of "many intelligent men from the United States" who
sought them out in Canada for political consultations. They discussed
"our true friends from the Chicago (Democratic) convention" and
even gave names of those who, they were assured, would have seats in
McClellan's Cabinet. They were really not well informed upon Northern
affairs, and even after the tide had turned against the Democrats
in September, they were still priding themselves on their diplomatic
achievement, still confident they had helped organize a great political
power, had "given a stronger impetus to the peace party of the North
than all other causes combined, and had greatly reduced the strength of
the war party."

While Clay and Thompson built their house of cards in Canada, the
Richmond Government bent anxious eyes on the western battlefront.
Sherman, though repulsed in his one frontal attack at Kenesaw Mountain,
had steadily worked his way by the left flank of the Confederate army,
until in early July he was within six miles of Atlanta. All the lower
South was a-tremble with apprehension. Deputations were sent to Richmond
imploring the removal of Johnston from the western command. What had he
done since his appointment in December but retreat? Such was the tenor
of public opinion. "It is all very well to talk of Fabian policy," said
one of his detractors long afterward, "and now we can see we were
rash to say the least. But at the time, all of us went wrong together.
Everybody clamored for Johnston's removal." Johnston and Davis were not
friends; but the President hesitated long before acting. And yet, with
each day, political as well as military necessity grew more imperative.
Both at Washington and Richmond the effect that the fighting in Georgia
had on Northern opinion was seen to be of the first importance. Sherman
was staking everything to break the Confederate line and take Atlanta.
He knew that a great victory would have incalculable effect on the
Northern election. Davis knew equally well that the defeat of Sherman
would greatly encourage the peace party in the North. But he had no
general of undoubted genius whom he could put in Johnston's place.
However, the necessity for a bold stroke was so undeniable, and
Johnston appeared so resolute to continue his Fabian policy, that Davis
relucta