rescued its affirmations from obscurity and mystery?

I believe that he has done nothing of the kind, but that he has simply
reaffirmed the individual's experiences in a more generalized
vocabulary. And again, I can be excused from proving technically that
the transcendentalist reasonings fail to make religion universal, for I
can point to the plain fact that a majority of scholars, even
religiously disposed ones, stubbornly refuse to treat them as
convincing. The whole of Germany, one may say, has positively rejected
the Hegelian argumentation. As for Scotland, I need only mention
Professor Fraser's and Professor Pringle-Pattison's memorable
criticisms, with which so many of you are familiar.[300] Once more, I
ask, if transcendental idealism were {445} as objectively and
absolutely rational as it pretends to be, could it possibly fail so
egregiously to be persuasive?

[300] A. C. Fraser: Philosophy of Theism, second edition, Edinburgh
and London, 1899, especially part ii, chaps. vii. and viii. A. Seth
[Pringle-Pattison]: Hegelianism and Personality, Ibid., 1890, passim.

The most persuasive arguments in favor of a concrete individual Soul of
the world, with which I am acquainted, are those of my colleague,
Josiah Royce, in his Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Boston, 1885; in
his Conception of God, New York and London, 1897; and lately in his
Aberdeen Gifford Lectures, The World and the Individual, 2 vols., New
York and London, 1901-02. I doubtless seem to some of my readers to
evade the philosophic duty which my thesis in this lecture imposes on
me, by not even attempting to meet Professor Royce's arguments
articulately. I admit the momentary evasion. In the present lectures,
which are cast throughout in a popular mould, there seemed no room for
subtle metaphysical discussion, and for tactical purposes it was
sufficient the contention of philosophy being what it is (namely, that
religion can be transformed into a universally convincing science), to
point to the fact that no religious philosophy has actually convinced
the mass of thinkers. Meanwhile let me say that I hope that the
present volume may be followed by another, if I am spared to write it,
in which not only Professor Royce's arguments, but others for monistic
absolutism shall be considered with all the technical fullness which
their great importance calls for. At present I resign myself to lying
passive under the reproach of superficiality.