off, for war was already begun in a small way. The Spaniards had seized
American boats on trading voyages down the river, and the Americans had
retaliated upon some petty Spanish settlements. Spain, moreover, seemed
at first no more inclined to listen to compromise than the South was.

England watched this controversy with interest. She had no expectation
of recovering for herself the Floridas, which she had lost in the war of
the Revolution, and had finally ceded to Spain by the treaty of 1783;
but she was quite willing to see that power get into trouble on the
Mississippi question, and more than willing that it should threaten the
peace and union of the States. Her own boundary line west of the
Alleghanies might possibly be extended far south of the Great Lakes, if
the Northern and Southern States should divide into two confederacies;
but, apart from any lust of territory, she rejoiced at anything that
threatened to check the growth of her late colonies.

Fortunately, however, the question was disposed of, before the
Constitutional Convention met at Philadelphia, by the failure to secure
a treaty. The Spanish minister, Guardoqui, consented, at length, after
long resistance, to accept as a compromise the navigation of the river
for five and twenty years; but Mr. Jay, who was willing, could he have
had his way, to concede anything, found at that stage of the
negotiations he could not command votes enough in Congress to secure a
treaty even in that modified form. Hitherto he had relied upon a
resolution passed by Congress in August, 1786, by the vote of seven
Northern States against five Southern. This, it was assumed, repealed a
resolution of the year before, and authorized the secretary to make a
treaty. The resolution of the year before, August, 1785, had been passed
by the votes of nine States, and was in confirmation of a provision of
the Articles of Confederation declaring that "no treaties with foreign
powers should be entered into but by the assent of nine States." The
minority contended that such a resolution could not be repealed by the
vote of only seven States, for that would be to violate a fundamental
condition of the Articles of Confederation. It is easy to see now that
there ought not to have been a difference among honorable men on such a
point as that. Nevertheless Mr. Jay, supported by some of the strongest
Northern men, held that the votes of seven States could be made, in a
roundabout way, to autho