ife? If we compare these stout
monistic declarations of 1849 and 1858 with the equally decided
dualistic utterances in Virchow's Munich address of 1877, we perceive
that he could not give the lie more fiercely to his former fundamental
opinions than he has there done. Not quite twenty years have passed
by, and yet, in the course of that time, in Virchow's views of the
universe, in his conception of human nature, and of the soul-life, a
change has been effected than which we can conceive of no greater. We
learn to our surprise that psychical and corporeal processes are
wholly different phenomena; that no scientific necessity whatever
exists for extending the province of psychical processes beyond the
circle of those bodies in which, and by which, we see them actually
exhibited. "We may ultimately explain the processes of the human mind
as chemical, but at any rate, it is not yet our business to amalgamate
these two subjects!"
From the whole psychological discussion which is involved in Virchow's
Munich address, it is made clear that at the present time he regards
the "soul" in a purely dualistic sense as a substance, an immaterial
essence which only temporarily takes up its abode in the body. Highly
characteristic of this is the remarkable sentence, "If I explain
attraction and repulsion as psychical phenomena, I simply throw the
psyche out of the window; the psyche ceases to be a psyche." If we
substitute for the word "psyche" the word which corresponds to
Virchow's earlier mechanistic view--the word "motion" (or peculiar
mode of motion)--the sentence runs thus: "If I explain attraction and
repulsion as phenomena of motion, I simply throw motion out of the
window."
Almost more remarkable is Virchow's assertion that the lowest animals
have no psychic properties; that, on the contrary, "these are only to
be found in the higher, and, with perfect certainty, only in the
highest animals." It is only to be regretted that Virchow has not here
stated what he understands by the higher and the highest animals;
where that remarkable dividing line is, beyond which the soul suddenly
appears in the hitherto soulless body. Every zoologist who is in some
degree familiar with the results of comparative morphology and
physiology will here clasp his hands in astonishment, for by this
proposition Virchow seems to mean that we must ascribe a soul-life
only to those animals in which special soul-organs, in the form of a
central and peri
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