th variation,
survival, and heredity, it may very well--for anything that Owen, or
others who followed in this line of criticism, show to the
contrary--have produced every species of plant and animal that has ever
appeared upon the face of the earth.

Another and closely allied objection is, that the theory of natural
selection "personifies an abstraction." Or, as the Duke of Argyll states
it, the theory is "essentially the image of mechanical necessity
concealed under the clothes, and parading in the mask, of mental
purpose. The word 'natural' suggests Matter, and the physical forces.
The word 'selection' suggests Mind, and the powers of choice." This,
however, is a mere quarrelling about words. Darwin called the principle
which he had discovered by the name natural selection in order to mark
the analogy between it and artificial selection. No doubt in this
analogy there is not necessarily supposed to be in nature any
counterpart to the mind of the breeder, nor, therefore, to his powers of
intelligent choice. But there is no need to limit the term _selection_
(_se_ and _lego_, Gr. [Greek: lego]) to powers of intelligent choice. As
previously remarked, a bank of sea-weed on the sea-shore may be said to
have been selected by the waves from all the surrounding sand and
stones. Similarly, we may say that grain is selected from chaff by the
wind in the process of winnowing corn. Or, if it be thought that there
is any ambiguity involved in such a use of the term in the case of
"Natural Selection," there is no objection to employing the phrase which
has been coined by Mr. Spencer as its equivalent--namely, "Survival of
the Fittest." The point of the theory is, that those organisms which are
best suited to their surroundings are allowed to live and to propagate,
while those which are less suited are eliminated; and whether we call
this process a process of selection, or call it by any other name, is
clearly immaterial.

A material question is raised only when it is asked whether the process
is one that can be ascribed to causation strictly natural. It is often
denied that such is the case, on the ground that natural selection does
not originate the variations which it favours, but depends upon the
variations being supplied by some other means. For, it is said, all that
natural selection does is to preserve the suitable variations _after
they have arisen_. Natural selection does not _cause_ these suitable
variations; and ther