whole nineteenth
century she has shown herself a very shifty and unreliable protectress
of Servia. She made use of the smaller country when it suited her own
aggressive purposes against others, and she dropped it whenever it
served her ends. It was so at the time of the Turkish war of 1877 and of
the Berlin Congress, and it remained so until with the advent of the
present dynasty Servia offered a sure prospect of becoming and remaining
a permanent tool in Russia's hands and a thorn in our flesh.

Russia is an aggressive power. For 200 years she has extended her
dominions at the cost of Sweden first, of Poland and Turkey afterward.
Now she thinks our turn has come. Finding us to be in the way of her
ultimate aims in the Balkan Peninsula, she began to regard us as her
enemy. For years the propaganda for undermining the bases of our empire
has been carried on in the name of Pan-Slavism. It seems that she judged
that now the time had come to draw the consequences and to bring things
to a final issue. With what result remains to be seen.

Germany Bound to Aid Austria.

By the terms of our treaty of alliance Germany was bound to come to our
assistance if we were attacked by Russia. There was no secrecy about
that treaty. Its text had been made public long ago and its purely
defensive character brought to the knowledge of the world. No more than
we did Germany entertain hostile intentions or nourish hostile feelings
against Russia. There were no clashing interests to excite the first, no
historical reminiscences to justify the second. If it is otherwise in
Russia, it is because her present leaders find German power in the way
of their conquering aspirations against us. Germany, true to her
obligations, hastened to our side when she saw us menaced, and when she
declared war she did it because she had positive information that in
spite of formal and solemn assurances to the contrary Russia
mobilization was proceeding.

The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance have never been made public.
Whether it was concluded merely for defensive or also for offensive
purposes, and whether France was obliged by her treaty to draw the sword
in the present case, remains therefore a matter of surmise. But there is
no mystery about the feelings of France with regard to Germany, and no
doubt about the greed for revenge which during the last forty-four years
has swayed the overwhelming majority of her people and been the
dominant factor of he