instructed the murder candidates in their use. At last we could stand it
no longer. What we wanted from Servia was the punishment of the plotters
and accomplices and a guarantee for normal relations in the future. This
was the object of our ultimatum. Servia made a show of complying with
some of our demands, but in reality her answer was evasive.

These facts are exposed and authenticated in the note which we sent to
the powers after having presented our ultimatum in Belgrade and in the
memorandum which accompanied it. I do not know whether the American
papers published these documents at the time. Today they are outstripped
by greater events, but for the just appreciation of our proceedings in
regard to Servia they are indispensable.

In reality, however, our conflict with Servia was not the cause of the
great war now raging, but only the spark which brought the overloaded
powder barrel to explosion. Who talks of Servia today, and who believes
that France, England, and Japan are making war on Germany and on us
because of Servia? The war broke out because Russia decided to shield
Servia against the consequences of her provocations and because, owing
to preconcerted arrangements, the situation in Europe was such that the
action of one great power was bound to bring all or nearly all the
others into the field. And again those preconcerted arrangements were
the outcome of a mass of pent-up passions, of hatred, envy, and
jealousy, the like of which--all Hague conferences and pacific unions
notwithstanding--the world has never seen before.

We are fully aware of the danger which threatened us from Russia when we
formulated our demands in Belgrade. Russia's population is three times
as large as ours and it was not with a light heart that our Emperor-King
took his final resolution. But our national honor and our very existence
as a self-respecting power were at stake. We could not hesitate. Now we
are in a struggle for life or death and we mean to carry it through with
full confidence in the rightfulness of our cause and in the force of our
arms. In one respect events have already belied the calculations of our
enemies, who counted on internal dissensions within our own borders. I
am happy to say that Croatians, Slovenes, and a large majority of our
own Servians are fighting in our ranks with the same valor and
enthusiasm as Czechs, Rumanians, Poles, Magyars, and Germans.

But why did Russia decide to assail us? During the