er yet been brought into operation. His plan was to establish in every
province at least three officers holding their authority directly from
the crown, and only responsible to it, who would therefore act as checks
one upon another. These were the satrap, the military commandant, and
the secretary. The satrap was charged with the civil administration, and
especially with the department of finance. The commandant was supreme
over the troops. The office of the secretary is less clearly defined;
but it probably consisted mainly in keeping the Court informed by
despatches of all that went on in the province. Thus, if the satrap
were inclined to revolt, he had, in the first place, to persuade the
commandant, who would naturally think that, if he ran the risk, it might
as well be for himself; and, further, he had to escape the lynx eyes of
the secretary, whose general right of superintendence gave him entrance
everywhere, and whose prospects of advancement would probably depend a
good deal upon the diligence and success with which he discharged the
office of "King's Eye" and "Ear." So, if the commandant were ambitious
of independent sway, he must persuade the satrap, or he would have no
money to pay his troops; and he too must blind the secretary, or else
bribe him into silence. As for the secretary, having neither men
nor money at his command, it was impossible that he should think of
rebellion.

But the precautions taken against revolt did not end here. Once a year,
according to Xenophon, or more probably at irregular intervals, an
officer came suddenly down from the Court with a commission to inspect
a province. Such persons were frequently of royal rank, brothers or sons
of the king. They were accompanied by an armed force, and were empowered
to correct whatever was amiss in the province, and in case of necessity
to report to the crown the insubordination or incompetency of its
officers. If this system had been properly maintained, it is evident
that it would have acted as a most powerful check upon misgovernment,
and would have rendered revolt almost impossible.

Another mode by which it was sought to secure the fidelity of the
satraps and commandants was by choosing them from among the king's blood
relations, or else attaching them to the crown by marriage with one of
the princesses. It was thought that the affection of sons and brothers
would be a restraint upon their ambition, and that even connections by
marriage wo