were regular army officers. The latter ended the
disturbances, employing first and last some twelve companies of
Philippine scouts, armed, officered, paid, equipped and disciplined
as are the regular soldiers of the United States army, and a similar
number of constabulary soldiers. Eleven stations in the restricted
field of operations of this outlaw were occupied by scouts. There were
few armed conflicts in force between Ola's men and these troops. In
fact, it was only with the greatest difficulty that this band, which
from time to time dissolved into the population only to reappear
again, could be located even by the native soldiers. It would have
been impracticable successfully to use American troops for such work.

Referring to the statement made by Blount [492] that Vice-Governor
Wright made a visit to Albay in 1903 in the interest "of the
peace-at-any-price policy that the Manila Government was bent on,"
and the implication that he went there to conduct peace negotiations,
General Bandholtz, who suppressed outlawry in Albay, has said that
Vice-Governor Wright and Commissioner Pardo de Tavera came there
at his request to look into conditions with reference to certain
allegations which had been made.

Colonel Bandholtz and the then chief of constabulary, General Allen,
were supported by the civil governor and the commission in their
recommendations that no terms should be made with the outlaws. The
following statement occurs in a letter from General Bandholtz dated
September 21, 1903:--

"No one is more anxious to terminate this business than I am,
nevertheless I think it would be a mistake to offer any such
inducements, and that more lasting benefits would result by hammering
away as we have been doing."

And General Allen said in an indorsement to the Philippine
Commission:--

"... in my opinion the judgment of Colonel Bandholtz in matters
connected with the pacification of Albay should receive favourable
consideration. Halfway measures are always misinterpreted and used
to the detriment of the Government among the ignorant followers of
the outlaws."

These views prevailed.

Blount has claimed that the death rate in the Albay jail at this
time was very excessive, and cites it as an instance of the result
of American maladministration.

Assuming that his tabulation [493] of the dead who died in the Albay
jail between May 30 and September, 1903, amounting to 120, is correct,
the following statements shou