t of them. In order therefore
that the Resemblance in the Ideas be Wit, it is necessary that the Ideas
should not lie too near one another in the Nature of things; for where
the Likeness is obvious, it gives no Surprize. To compare one Man's
Singing to that of another, or to represent the Whiteness of any Object
by that of Milk and Snow, or the Variety of its Colours by those of the
Rainbow, cannot be called Wit, unless besides this obvious Resemblance,
there be some further Congruity discovered in the two Ideas that is
capable of giving the Reader some Surprize. Thus when a Poet tells us,
the Bosom of his Mistress is as white as Snow, there is no Wit in the
Comparison; but when he adds, with a Sigh, that it is as cold too, it
then grows into Wit. Every Reader's Memory may supply him with
innumerable Instances of the same Nature. For this Reason, the
Similitudes in Heroick Poets, who endeavour rather to fill the Mind with
great Conceptions, than to divert it with such as are new and
surprizing, have seldom any thing in them that can be called Wit. Mr.
_Lock's_ Account of Wit, with this short Explanation, comprehends most
of the Species of Wit, as Metaphors, Similitudes, Allegories, AEnigmas,
Mottos, Parables, Fables, Dreams, Visions, dramatick Writings,
Burlesque, and all the Methods of Allusion: As there are many other
Pieces of Wit, (how remote soever they may appear at first sight, from
the foregoing Description) which upon Examination will be found to agree
with it.

As _true Wit_ generally consists in this Resemblance and Congruity of
Ideas, _false Wit_ chiefly consists in the Resemblance and Congruity
sometimes of single Letters, as in Anagrams, Chronograms, Lipograms, and
Acrosticks: Sometimes of Syllables, as in Ecchos and Doggerel Rhymes:
Sometimes of Words, as in Punns and Quibbles; and sometimes of whole
Sentences or Poems, cast into the Figures of _Eggs, Axes_, or _Altars_:
Nay, some carry the Notion of Wit so far, as to ascribe it even to
external Mimickry; and to look upon a Man as an ingenious Person, that
can resemble the Tone, Posture, or Face of another.

As _true Wit_ consists in the Resemblance of Ideas, and _false Wit_ in
the Resemblance of Words, according to the foregoing Instances; there is
another kind of Wit which consists partly in the Resemblance of Ideas,
and partly in the Resemblance of Words; which for Distinction Sake I
shall call _mixt Wit_. This kind of Wit is that which abounds in
_C