Piece of Wit, is to translate it
into a different Language: If it bears the Test, you may pronounce it
true; but if it vanishes in the Experiment, you may conclude it to have
been a Punn. In short, one may say of a Punn, as the Countryman
described his Nightingale, that it is _vox et praeterea nihil,_ a Sound,
and nothing but a Sound. On the contrary, one may represent true Wit by
the Description which _Aristinetus_ makes of a fine Woman; when she is
_dressed_ she is Beautiful, when she is _undressed_ she is Beautiful; or
as _Mercerus_ has translated it [more Emphatically]
_Induitur, formosa est: Exuitur, ipsa forma est._
C.
[Footnote 1: fine]
* * * * *
No. 62. Friday, May 11, 1711. Addison.
'Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons.'
Hor.
Mr. _Lock_ has an admirable Reflexion upon the Difference of Wit and
Judgment, whereby he endeavours to shew the Reason why they are not
always the Talents of the same Person. His Words are as follows:
_And hence, perhaps, may be given some Reason of that common
Observation, That Men who have a great deal of Wit and prompt
Memories, have not always the clearest Judgment, or deepest Reason.
For Wit lying most in the Assemblage of Ideas, and putting those
together with Quickness and Variety, wherein can be found any
Resemblance or Congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures and
agreeable Visions in the Fancy; Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite
on the other Side, In separating carefully one from another, Ideas
wherein can be found the least Difference, thereby to avoid being
misled by Similitude, and by Affinity to take one thing for another.
This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion;
wherein, for the most part, lies that Entertainment and Pleasantry of
Wit which strikes so lively on the Fancy, and is therefore so
acceptable to all People._ [1]
This is, I think, the best and most Philosophical Account that I have
ever met with of Wit, which generally, though not always, consists in
such a Resemblance and Congruity of Ideas as this Author mentions. I
shall only add to it, by way of Explanation, That every Resemblance of
Ideas is not that which we call Wit, unless it be such an one that gives
_Delight_ and _Surprise_ to the Reader: These two Properties seem
essential to Wit, more particularly the las
|