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for Christendom, and will substitute for it what is no better than
the Communism of Paris enlarged and exalted into a guide of
international relations. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect that
minds in the condition of the "increasing portion" should on any
terms accept an appeal to history. But, for the sake of others,
not yet so completely emancipated from the yoke of facts, I simply
ask at what date it was that the liberal administrations of this
country adopted the "permanent sentiment" and the "matter of
principle" which have been their ruin? Not in 1859-60, when they
energetically supported the redemption and union of Italy. Not in
1861, when, on the occurrence of the Trent affair, they at a few
days' notice despatched ten thousand men to Halifax. Not when, in
concert with Europe, they compelled the sultan to cut off the head
of his tyrannical pasha, and to establish a government in the
Lebanon not dependent for its vital breath on Constantinople. Not
when in 1863 they invited France to join in an _ultimatum_ to the
German Powers, and to defend Denmark with us against the intrigues
which Germany was carrying on under the plea of the Duke of
Augustenburg's title to the Duchies; and when they were told by
Louis Napoleon in reply that that might be a great British
interest, but that it had no significance for France. Not when in
1870 they formed in a few days their double treaty for the defence
of Belgium. Does, then, the whole indictment rest on this--that, in
conformity with the solemn declaration of the European Powers at
Paris in 1856, they cured a deep-seated quarrel with America by
submitting to the risk of a very unjust award at Geneva; and
reconciled a sister nation, and effected a real forward step in
the march, of civilisation at about half the cost which the
present administration has recently incurred (but without paying
it) in agitating and disturbing Europe? Or is it that during all
those years, and many more years before them, while liberty and
public law were supported, and British honour vindicated,
territorial cupidity was not inflamed by the deeds or words of
statesmen, British interests were not set up as "the first and
great commandment," and it was thought better to consolidate a
still undeveloped empire, which might well satisfy every ambition,
a