ded line from Metz northward along the eastern boundary of
France--a distance of about 130 miles. That mobilization was a wonderful
exhibition of military efficiency. From Verdun to Paris, slightly
southwest, is also about 130 miles.

The German plan of campaign may be crudely stated as follows: Regard
that extended line as a flail ready to fall, hinged near Verdun, moved
in a circle until the northern tip, under command of Von Kluck, should
fall with all the energy Germany could put into the blow on Paris. In
the meantime, the other armies would crush back, outflank, defeat, and
capture the small British and hastily mobilized French armies that
confronted them along the entire line. It was believed that a short
campaign would crush France, over-awe Great Britain, and end the war in
the West. It was thought that six weeks would be ample to accomplish
this result.

BELGIAN RESISTANCE.

Germany expected that at the most a day or so would see Belgian
resistance broken and the dash on Paris begun. It was not safe to start
such a forward rush with Belgium unconquered. This was the first of
many, many mistakes made by Germany. It required two weeks to break down
this resistance. Thus the northern end of the flail was held and
movement along the entire line was slowed down or suspended. The
unexpected delay saved France. Let us remember this when we read the
story of Belgium's martyrdom, a story written in blood. Then began the
fulfillment of the threat of William II to the Prince of Monaco "the
world will see what it never dreamed of." And truly the world never
dreamed of the terrible scenes that attended the sack of Louvain (August
26). Not until after the situation in Belgium had been given a bloody
setting did the first dash on Paris begin (August 23).

RETREAT TO THE MARNE.

We are now approaching the "Miracle of the Marne." The line of German
armies along the eastern frontier of France were confronted by the
forces of France, hastily mobilized during the delay occasioned by the
heroic but pathetically futile resistance of Belgium. The first English
army had also assumed a position before the menacing rush of the German
forces. The only thing the Allies could do was to retreat. This
movement, directed by General Joffre, was a remarkably able one. His
plan was to give ground before the advance without risking a decisive
battle until he could rearrange his forces and gain a favorable
position. Only with difficulty