association and
cognate subjects; G.2 has censorship, enemy intelligence, gathering and
disseminating information, preparation of maps, and all similar
subjects; G.3 is charged with all strategic studies and plans, movement
of troops, and the supervision of combat operations; G.4 co-ordinates
important questions of supply, construction, transport arrangements for
combat, and of the operations of the service of supply, and of
hospitalization and the evacuation of the sick and wounded; G.5
supervises the various schools and has general direction and
co-ordination of education and training.

The first Chief of Staff was Colonel (now Major-General) James G.
Harbord, who was succeeded in May, 1918, by Major-General James W.
McAndrew. To these officers, to the deputy Chief of Staff, and to the
assistant Chiefs of Staff, who, as heads of sections, aided them, great
credit is due for the results obtained not only in perfecting the
General Staff organization but in applying correct principles to the
multiplicity of problems that have arisen.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCES.

After a thorough consideration of Allied organizations it was decided
that our combat division should consist of four regiments of infantry of
3,000 men, with three battalions to a regiment and four companies of 250
men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade of three regiments,
a machine gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench-mortar battery,
a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staffs and
military police. These, with medical and other units, made a total of
over 28,000 men, or practically double the size of a French or German
division. Each corps would normally consist of six divisions--four
combat and one depot and one replacement division--and also two
regiments of cavalry, and each army of from three to five corps. With
four divisions fully trained, a corps could take over an American sector
with two divisions in line and two in reserve, with the depot and
replacement divisions prepared to fill the gaps in the ranks.

Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force which should be
able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly, the
development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of
the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The
plan of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month
for acclimatization and instruction in small units from battali