intricate administration and more ships were required to maintain the
efficiency of the squadron by a system of reliefs. Hawke noted also
another difficulty,--the fatigue of the crews in cleaning their ships'
bottoms. It was even more important to success, he said, to restore the
seaman, worn by cruising, by a few days quiet and sleep in port, than to
clean thoroughly at the expense of exhausting them. "If the enemy should
slip out and run," he writes, "we must follow as fast as we can."
Details such as these, as well as the main idea, must be borne in mind,
if due credit is to be given to Hawke for one of the most decisive
advances ever made in the practice of naval campaigning.
Some time, however, was to elapse before the close watch of the French
ports became a leading feature in the naval policy of the government.
The early disasters of the war had forced the king, after much
resistance, finally to accept the first Pitt as the leading minister of
the Crown, in June, 1757. Pitt's military purpose embraced two principal
objects: 1, the establishment of the British colonial system by the
destruction of that of France, which involved as a necessary precedent
the control of the sea by a preponderant navy; and, 2, the support of
Frederic of Prussia, then engaged in his deadly contest with the
combined armies of France, Austria, and Russia. Frederic's activity made
a heavy drain upon the troops and the treasure of France, preventing her
by just so much from supporting her colonies and maintaining her fleet;
but, heavily outnumbered as he was, it was desirable to work all
possible diversion in his favor by attacks elsewhere. This Pitt proposed
to do by a series of descents upon the French coast, compelling the
enemy to detach a large force from before the Prussian king to protect
their own shores.
As far as the home naval force was concerned, the years 1757 and 1758
were dominated by this idea of diversion in favor of Frederic the
Great. From the general object of these enterprises, the army was
necessarily the principal agent; but the navy was the indispensable
auxiliary. Hawke's association with them is interesting chiefly as
illustrative of professional character; for there was little or no room
for achievement of naval results. The first expedition in which he was
concerned was that against Rochefort in 1757. This, though now long
forgotten, occasioned by its failure a storm of contemporary
controversy. Whatever cha
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